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PAPER-THIN SAFEGUARDS AND
MASS SURVEILLANCE IN INDIA
Chinmayi Arun1

The Indian government's new mass surveillance systems present new threats
to the right to privacy. Mass interception of communication, keyword searches
and easy access to particular users' data suggest that state is moving towards
unfettered large-scale monitoring of communication. This is particularly ominous
given that our privacy safeguards remain inadequate even for targeted surveillance and its more familiar pitfalls.
This need for better safeguards was made apparent when the Gujarat government illegally placed a young woman under surveillance for obviously illegitimate purposes 2, demonstrating that the current system is prone to egregious
misuse. While the lack of proper safeguards is problematic even in the context
of targeted surveillance, it threatens the health of our democracy in the context
of mass surveillance. The proliferation of mass surveillance means that vast
amounts of data are collected easily using information technology, and lie relatively unprotected.
This paper examines the right to privacy and surveillance in India, in an effort
to highlight more clearly the problems that are likely to emerge with mass surveillance of communication by the Indian Government. It does this by teasing out
our privacy rights jurisprudence and the concerns underpinning it, by considering its utility in the context of mass surveillance and then explaining the kind of
harm that might result if mass surveillance continues unchecked.
The first part of this paper threads together the evolution of Indian constitutional principles on privacy in the context of communication surveillance as
well as search and seizure. It covers discussions of privacy in the context of our
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fundamental rights by the draftspersons of our constitution, and then moves on to
the ways in which the Supreme Court of India has been reading the right to privacy into the constitution. The second part of this paper discusses the difference
between mass surveillance and targeted surveillance, and international human
rights principles that attempt to mitigate the ill effects of mass surveillance. The
concluding part of the paper discusses mass surveillance in India, and makes a
case for expanding our existing privacy safeguards to protect the right to privacy
in a meaningful manner in face of state surveillance.
I. PRIVACY AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
At the time of drafting of the Indian constitution, there were limited examples
of codification of the right to privacy. Common law for instance did not have a
clearly articulated privacy doctrine.3 The European Convention on Human Rights,
which contains one of the most powerful articulations of the right to privacy, was
not in force at the time. However the United States of America used a patchwork
of law to protect privacy in different contexts, and the principles from this law
almost made its way into the Indian Constitution in the form of an amendment
based on the US Fourth Amendment.
The Constituent Assembly did not take the right to privacy as seriously as
it should have whilst crafting the Fundamental Rights. This might have been
because of the relative scarcity of material on the right to privacy at the time.
An amendment to insert the right against unreasonable searches was very
nearly passed by the house, but ended up being dropped. This resulted in some
initial reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to read this right into the
Constitution. However the Supreme Court of India did eventually read the right
to privacy into the fundamental rights, and has been tracing out its contours
through the different cases that implicate this right.
A. The Constituent Assembly and the Right to Privacy
Two different forms of privacy were proposed as insertions to the
Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution and both were rejected with very
little debate. One of these was to do with safeguards against unreasonable search
and the other protected the privacy of correspondence.
The amendment to embed safeguards against arbitrary search and seizure in
the Indian Constitution was moved by Kazi Syed Karimuddin.4 The proposed text
read as follows:
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"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized"5
Dr. Ambedkar was willing to accept Karimuddin's proposal. 6 He pointed out
that this clause was already in the Criminal Procedure Code, and was therefore a
part of Indian law, but also acknowledged that it may be desirable in the interests
7
of personal liberty to 'place these provisions beyond the reach of the legislature'.
The chaos during voting over the proposal suggests that it was contentious.
The Vice-President attempted twice to put the Karimuddin text to vote.8 Although
he declared the amendment as having been accepted both times, Mr. T.T.
Krishnamachari objected, saying both times that the majority vote was of those
who were not in favour of the amendment. 9 The records of the day's debates suggest that there was unrest in the house at the time. 0 Jawaharlal Nehru supported
a proposal to postpone the vote, and the vote was postponed accordingly."
This incident proved controversial later on, and objections were raised over
the manner in which the vote was shelved. Eventually Karimuddin's amendment
was put to vote on a different day with no debate, and was defeated. 2 The consequence was that the privacy principles safeguarding citizens from intrusive search
and seizure were never inserted in the Constitution. These principles are a part of
what the Supreme Court later recognized as critical rights. However, Constituent
Assembly seems to have made its decision with very little meaningful debate on
the subject.
The only arguments offered against the insertion of this right, were offered
by P.S. Deshmukh in the context of a similar amendment moved by Pandit
Thakur Das Bhargva. Bhargva's amendment contained text requiring that "no
person shall be subjected to unnecessary restraints or to unreasonable search of
person or property", echoing the Karimuddin amendment. 3 Deshmukh was not
5
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convinced of its necessity and he said that the Criminal Procedure Code offered
adequate safeguards, but that its provisions were not respected. 4 He argued that it
would therefore follow that similar principles inserted in the Constitution would
also be ignored. 5 In a speech riddled with inconsistencies, he made the very curious argument that the liberties granted to the people prior to independence would
be unsustainable after independence; and that fettering the parliament's discretion
with procedure in the context of law and order would be wrong. 6 It is unclear
whether this reasoning prevailed, or whether concerns which were not properly
articulated during the Constituent Assembly's sessions influenced the vote.
Apart from privacy in the context of search and seizure, the need for the
right to privacy in the context of correspondence was also highlighted to the
Constituent Assembly. Communication surveillance was addressed in an amendment moved by Somnath Lahiri. This was to include a clause protecting the
privacy of correspondence within the fundamental right of liberty (which later
became Article 19) in the Constitution.7 The house resolved to take up the Lahiri
proposal towards the end of the discussion on the fundamental rights instead of
in the context of the right to liberty. It appears however that the proposal was
never seriously considered or even put up for vote.
The records of the Constituent Assembly debates are therefore disappointing if
one is seeking powerful reasoning to explain the omission of the right to privacy.
There were members who made a powerful case for the inclusion of this right
on more than one occasion, but for reasons that are not entirely clear, their arguments were brushed aside.
B. The Supreme Court of India Traces Out Citizens' Rights Against
Illegal Surveillance
While the constitution and the choices made about the Fundamental Rights
were still fresh in public memory in 1954, the apex court refused to read the
right to privacy 8 into the Indian Constitution. This was in A.P. Sharma v. Satish
Chandra,where the Supreme Court declared that it could not import the right to
privacy analogous to the U.S. Fourth Amendment into a different fundamental
right given that the constitution makers had not thought to recognize this right to
privacy.19
However, the apex court gradually moved away from this position, to recognizing that other rights and liberties guaranteed in the Constitution would be
14
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seriously affected if the right to privacy was not protected. This process began
in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.20 , where the court discussed the relationship
between surveillance and personal liberty (personal liberty being guaranteed
by the Constitution) and found that unauthorised intrusion into a person's home
would interfere with her right to personal liberty. The right to privacy here was
conceived around the home, and unauthorised intrusions into homes were seen
as interference with the right to personal liberty. The court recognised "the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" and
declared that their right against unreasonable searches and seizures was not to be
2
violated. '
However this right was not seen to extend to the shadowing of citizens outside
their homes. In a dissent opinion that exhibited extraordinary foresight, Justice
Subba Rao maintained that broad surveillance powers put innocent citizens at
risk, and that the right to privacy is an integral part of personal liberty. 22 Subba
Rao recognised that when a person is shadowed, her movements will be constricted, and is certainly not free movement. Although he did not use the phrase,
in effect, he took into account what is now known as the 'chilling effect' of law.
The right to privacy as defined by the Supreme Court so far, now extends
beyond government intrusion into private homes. In Gobind v. State of A.P.3 the
Supreme Court said that the Constitution makers 'must be deemed to have conferred upon the individual as again the government a sphere where he should be
let alone'. Along with Kharak Singh24, this marks the beginning of the judiciary
reading parts of the Karimuddin amendment into the Constitution. The Supreme
Court acknowledged in Gobind case25 that the right to privacy is likely to be built
through a process of case-by-case development. This case also made it very clear
that wherever the fundamental right to privacy is implicated, a law infringing this
26
right must satisfy the compelling state interest test.
2
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wider interpretation advocated by Justice Subba Rao in his dissent. Canara Bank
also made it clear that inroads into the right to privacy for the purpose of surveillance must be for permissible reasons and according to just, fair and reasonable
procedure. 3' State action in violation of this procedure is open to a constitutional
challenge.
Most specific to communication surveillance are the safeguards resulting from
People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India3 2. In this case, the
Indian Supreme Court declared, that "the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office without interference can certainly be
claimed as 'right to privacy'.., telephone conversation isan important facet of a
man 's private life".33 The court ruled that telephone tapping would violate Article
21 of the Indian Constitution unless it was permitted by the procedure established
by law, and that it would also violate the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 unless it came within the restrictions permitted by Article
19(2). 34 Further, the Supreme Court clarified that even where law clearly defines
the situations in which interception may take place, this law must have procedural backing to ensure that the exercise of power is just and reasonable.35 The
lack of adequate procedural safeguards can mean that the substantive law violates
Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.
After a very promising narrative that recognized the role played by procedural
safeguards in protecting citizens' right to privacy, the Supreme Court regrettably
accepted Kapil Sibal's argument that it could not impose prior judicial scrutiny
in the absence of a statutory provision supporting such scrutiny. Had the court
declared the power to intercept communication under the Telegraph Act constitutionally untenable for this reason, this may have resulted in the introduction of
powerful safeguards. However the court opted instead to craft interim procedural
safeguards for the interception of communication under the Telegraph Act. These
safeguards consisted mostly of proper record-keeping and internal executive oversight by senior officers such as the home secretary, the cabinet secretary, the law
secretary and the telecommunications secretary.3 6 They are opaque and rely solely
on members of the executive to review surveillance requests, leaving little for
third party scrutiny, or challenge by affected parties (who may never find out that
37
they were placed under surveillance).
This highly inadequate and flawed process was included in the Telegraph Act
and the Information Technology Act, as a result of which the Supreme Court of
31

(2005) 1 SCC 496

AIR 2005 SC 186.

31 (1997) 1 SCC 301 AIR 1997 SC 568 ("PUCL").
33 PUCL, (1997) 1 SCC 301 AIR 1997 SC 568.
34 PUCL, (1997) 1 SCC 301 AIR 1997 SC 568.
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India missed a very significant opportunity to raise the minimum standards of
privacy protection in the context of surveillance of communication.
II. MASS SURVEILLANCE AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Our communication interception jurisprudence has focused on targeted surveillance for years. Rapid evolution in technology has however enabled surveillance which is different from targeted surveillance and its identification particular
individuals or organizations for monitoring. Mass surveillance operates very differently from targeted surveillance: states have bulk access to communication
content and related information, and are able to mine all communication data for
specific keywords or other information that might result in the identification of
targets.38
The international safeguards recommended for targeted surveillance assume
some prior suspicion of the target of surveillance. The clarity about the objective and the target makes it easier for 'objective assessment of the necessity and
proportionality of the contemplated surveillance, weighing the degree of the proposed intrusion against its anticipated value to a particular investigation'.39 These
safeguards for targeted surveillance emerge from International Human Rights
legal norms that require that there must be clear justification whenever there is
any interference with the right to privacy, such that there is a proportionality
analysis that ensures that there is compelling justification for any serious interference with protected human rights.40
The European Court of Human Rights has had occasion to consider this question of mass-surveillance in Liberty v. United Kingdom. This was a case that
resulted after the Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom operated a powerful facility that simultaneously intercepted a very large number of telephone
channels carrying facsimile, email, telephone and data communication. The
only safeguards in place were internal, consisting of broad warrants that covered several classes of communication, certification by the Secretary of State of
broad classes of information extracted with no discusses of specific targets or
3 Mass surveillance is described as "generalised suspicion" that as yet unidentified members of
a group may be of interest, as opposed to personalised surveillance which deals with identified
individuals who have triggered suspicion or concern. See Roger Clark, Information Technology
and Dataveillance (November 1987) available at <http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/CACM88.
html#MDV>.
19 Para 7, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(23-9-2014).
41 Para 12, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(23-9-2014).
41 Application No. 58243 of 2000 (European Court of Human Rights).
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addresses, filtering search terms based on the certificates and restriction of sharing the information only with recipients whose purposes to receive them were
proportionate and necessary. The court found these safeguards inadequate, particularly since the warrants and certification were framed in very wide terms.
It found that the scope or manner of exercise of the state's interception power
was not articulated with enough clarity, and there was no publicly accessible and
clearly defined procedure followed for the selection, examination, storage, sharing and destruction of intercepted material. Although the court found that the
United Kingdom's process contravened the privacy protection offered under the
European Convention of Human Rights, it did not clarify the specifics of what
might be an acceptable set of safeguards in the context of mass surveillance.
Drawing upon its own past jurisprudence, the European Court insisted on reasonable procedural safeguards. It stated quite clearly that there are significant
risks of arbitrariness when executive power is exercised in secret and that law
should be sufficiently clear to give citizens an adequate indication of the circumstances in which interception might take place. Additionally, the extent of discretion conferred and the manner of its exercise must be clear enough to protect
individuals from arbitrary interference.
This question is likely to be examined in more detail by the court in the near
future: London-based organisations Big Brother Watch, Open Rights Group,
English PEN and Constanze Kurz have brought the UK government before the
ECHR for the mass surveillance of data conducted by British spy agencies.
The United Nations is also veering towards framing useful norms - it has
recently passed a resolution 42 calling upon states to review their procedures, practices and legislation with respect to communication surveillance, including mass
surveillance, with a view to upholding privacy rights. The UN Special High
Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, in her report titled 'The right to
privacy in the digital age' has emphasized the importance of safeguards to protect rights during mass surveillance, and has pointed out that internal procedural
safeguards without independent external monitoring are inadequate for the protection of rights. 43 This report declares that effective protection of the law can
only be achieved if all the branches of government as well as an independent
civilian oversight agency are built into the procedural safeguards. 44 It also lists
among these safeguards, that known and accessible remedies are made available
to those whose privacy is violated. 4 These remedies must be effective, and must
42 UN General Assembly, Resolution on Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, 6 9th session,
A/C.3/69/L.26/Rev.1 (19-11-2014).
4' The right to privacy in the digital age, Report of the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/27/3, para 37.
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include a thorough and impartial investigation, the capacity to end ongoing viola46
tion and must even offer criminal prosecution as a remedy for gross violations.
III. CONCLUSION: NO EXCUSE FOR
INEFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS
Our safeguards in India apply only to targeted surveillance, and require written requests to be provided and reviewed before telephone tapping or interception is carried out. India has no requirements of transparency whether in the form
of disclosing the quantum of interception taking place each year, or in the form
of subsequent notification to people whose communication was intercepted. It
does not even have external oversight in the form of an independent regulatory
body or the judiciary to ensure that no abuse of surveillance systems takes place.
Given these structural flaws, the Gujarat illegal surveillance controversy is unsurprising. The complete lack of accountability for the misuse of the surveillance
framework in that context bodes ill for the manner in which surveillance is likely
to be used in India.
In this context, mass surveillance and the Central Monitoring system (CMS)
raises real concerns of extensive misuse of power by the state. News reports
in India indicate this is a move towards intercepting all communication over
the internet in India and scanning it for keywords like 'attack', 'bomb', 'blast'
or 'kill'. Tweets, status updates, emails, chat transcripts, and even voice traffic
over the Internet (including from platforms like Skype and Google Talk) will
be scanned by this system. In the context of surveillance of phone-calls CMS is
even more opaque than targeted surveillance since the state can intercept communication directly, without making requests to private telecommunication service
provider. This means that there is one less layer of scrutiny through which abuse
of power can reach the public. There is no one to ask whether the requisite paper
work is in place or to notice a dramatic increase in interception requests.
Unfettered mass surveillance does not augur well for democracy.
Understanding why this is so can be difficult owing to the nature of privacy
harms arising from mass surveillance. There are different kinds of privacy harms
that may result from surveillance, like disruption of valuable activity, and the
chilling of socially beneficial behavior like free speech.4 Among these is the creation of power imbalances like (excess executive power) that damage the social
structure. 48 These different harms tend to be acknowledged in a piecemeal fashion depending on context. For example, in Kharak Singh 49 , the problem was one
46 The right to privacy in the digital age, Report of the Office of the United Nations High
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of disruption of the target's activities as well as one of chilling socially beneficial
behavior. However only Justice Subba Rao was willing to acknowledge that the
latter was also a privacy problem. This acknowledgement of the chilling effect on
speech as a privacy problem is however unambiguous in PUCL case50 .
Privacy harms in the form of power imbalances that damage the social structure are the most difficult to identify clearly. Their impact remains invisible for
the large part. Solove points out that one of the problems with the identification
of such harms, is that privacy violations are often framed as injuries to individuals and weighed against security interests (seen as societal interests).5 0 This is a
misleading characterization since the protection of privacy is necessary to ensure
that abuse of power and inhibition of democratic participation are minimized 1 ,
both of which are societal interests. The acknowledgement of the right to privacy
as a societal interest offers a more useful way to frame the surveillance debate. It
clarifies the need to focus on oversight and accountability mechanisms 52, bearing
in mind the impact of unrestrained surveillance on the health of our democracy.
These arguments need to be articulated more forcefully in the context of mass
surveillance in India.
There are currently very limited safeguards to protect the right to privacy in
the face of mass surveillance or even targeted surveillance in India. While the
argument for surveillance is articulated in the form of national security and public order interests, this does not justify the absence of safeguards that might protect human rights and the balance of power in our democracy. The UN Special
High Commissioner for Human Rights has outlined important components of a
legal framework that protects privacy rights in the face of mass surveillance. 3
She has done so clearly, offering examples of what works and what does not,
such that it is apparent that the Indian privacy safeguards fall short of her best
practices guidelines.
There is no excuse for a democracy like India, which has articulated its commitment to human rights, not to put these privacy safeguards in place. However,
since the safeguards essentially check the wielding of executive power, it seems
unlikely that the executive will voluntarily put them in place without external
pressure. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court of India recognizes the damage that unrestrained mass surveillance will wreak on our democracy, and that
it takes its jurisprudence forward by several steps unimpeded by its own initial
reluctance to create powerful safeguards in PUCL telephone tapping case14.
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